The presence of the lagged shadow policy rate in the interest rate feedback rule reduces the government spending multiplier nontrivially when the policy rate is constrained at the zero lower bound (ZLB). In the economy with policy inertia, increased inflation and output due to higher government spending during a recession speed up the return of the policy rate to the steady state after the recession ends. This in turn dampens the expansionary effects of the government spending during the recession via expectations.
Introduction
Recent theoretical literature on the positive effects of fiscal policy has emphasized that the government spending multiplier on output can be quite large when the nominal interest rate is constrained at the zero lower bound (ZLB). For example, seminal papers by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011); Eggertsson (2011); and Woodford (2011) report a multiplier that is substantially greater than one in plausibly parameterized standard New Keynesian models.
As reviewed in detail later, the literature has mostly examined this issue using a model in which the policy rate is given by a truncated Taylor rule without policy inertia-that is, without an interest rate smoothing term. The goal of this paper is to examine the sensitivity of the government spending multiplier at the ZLB to the degree of policy inertia in the interest rate feedback rule. Our main focus is a version of the inertial policy rule in which today's shadow policy rate-a hypothetical policy rate that would prevail were it not for the ZLB constraint-depends on the lagged shadow policy rate. However, we will also examine an alternative version of the inertial Taylor rule in which the shadow policy rate today depends on the lagged actual policy rate.
The main result of our paper is that the presence of the lagged shadow policy rate in the interest rate feedback rule reduces the government spending multiplier at the ZLB in a quantitatively important way. Under a baseline parameterization of the model intended to mimic the Great Depression, the output multiplier at the ZLB is 1.1 with an inertial parameter of 0.9 and 2.5 without any inertia. The reason for the smaller multiplier under the inertial Taylor rule is as follows. Independent of policy inertia, an increase in government spending during a recession increases inflation and output during the recession.
In a model with policy inertia, this improved allocation during the recession speeds up the return of the policy rate to the steady state after the recession ends, which in turn dampens the expansionary effects of the government spending during the recession via expectations. The multiplier at the ZLB approaches the multiplier away from the ZLB from above as the inertia approaches unity, and it can go below one with a sufficiently high inertial parameter. However, for a plausible range of weights on the lagged policy rate, the ZLB multiplier remains above one.
By contrast, when the nominal interest rate is away from the ZLB, policy inertia increases the fiscal multiplier. In the presence of policy inertia, the nominal interest rate is slow to respond to an exogenous change in government spending. Thus, the expansionary effects of government spending are larger. However, the effects of policy inertia are quantitatively much smaller away from the ZLB than at the ZLB, and the multiplier remains below one in the former case. The claim in the existing literature that the government spending multiplier is larger at the ZLB than away from it is thus robust to policy inertia.
With the version of the inertial policy rule where the shadow rate today depends on the lagged actual policy rate, the degree of inertia does not affect the government spending multiplier at the ZLB at all in our baseline environment with a two-state crisis shock.
In this version of the model, what matters for the policy path after the recession is the actual policy rate at the end of the recession. Since the actual policy rate at the end of the recession is zero regardless of the government spending shock, the policy path-and thus the paths of inflation and output-after the recession is unaltered by the government spending shock during the recession. Accordingly, the inertial parameter does not affect the expansionary effects of the government spending shock during the recession in the economy with this version of the inertial policy rule.
To emphasize the importance of the endogeneity of post-recession policy rates in generating a lower government spending multiplier, we also consider the multipliers under other history-dependent monetary policy specifications: a price-level targeting rule, the Reifschneider-Williams (2000) rule, and optimal commitment policy. We find that the government spending multipliers are smaller under these three specifications of monetary policy determination than under the baseline non-inertial Taylor rule. Under all of these policies, government spending shocks during a recession lead to tighter policy after the recession, implying lower multipliers. Thus, the mechanism by which the shadow-rate version of the inertial Taylor rule reduces the multiplier is relevant to understanding why the government spending multiplier is lower under other widely studied policy rules.
Our focus on the inertial Taylor rule is motivated by two considerations. First, as reviewed in detail in Section 2, there is strong empirical evidence for the presence of the lagged policy rate in the nominal interest rate rule. When the policy rule is estimated in the context of structural models, the weight on the lagged policy rate is often estimated to be positive and large. Estimation of the reduced-form policy rule also lends support to the presence of policy inertia. Second, the presence of policy inertia is consistent with recent FOMC statements indicating that the Committee intends to keep the federal funds rate near zero for a considerable period of time after the economic recovery strengthens.
Introducing the lagged policy rate to the policy rule is one way, albeit not the only one, to characterize this policy of an extended period of low nominal interest rates.
Our results narrow the gap between theoretical multipliers in the New Keynesian model and recent empirical estimates of the multiplier at the ZLB. Using a dataset for the U.S. extending back to 1889, Ramey and Zubairy (2014) find no evidence that the government spending multipliers on output are larger when the policy rate is constrained at the ZLB than when it is not, and that the multiplier is less than one at the ZLB. Using a dataset for the U.K. during the 1930s, Crafts and Mills (2012) find the multiplier below unity when the interest rate is constrained at the ZLB. Our analyses show that policy inertia can bring the prediction of the New Keynesian model closer to these empirical estimates. Policy inertia reduces the multiplier by reducing the effects of government spending shocks on expected inflation; this reduced response of inflation expectations is also consistent with the empirical evidence from Dupor and Li (2013) , who find no evidence that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Acts pushed up inflation expectations in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. This paper is related to work on the government spending multiplier that emphasizes the role of the ZLB constraint. Earlier work by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011); Eggertsson (2011); and Woodford (2011) have emphasized that the multiplier can be substantially larger than one in plausibly parameterized New Keynesian models. Since then, many authors have examined the government spending multiplier at the ZLB in various settings. Examples include Albertini, Poirier, and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2014) ; Braun, Körber, and Waki (2013) ; Braun and Waki (2010) ; Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Muller (2010) ; Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2014) ; Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013); Bouakez, Guillard, and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2014) ; Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012); Mertens and Ravn (2014); . All of these papers consider only the truncated Taylor rule without any inertia.
While the majority of the literature focuses on the non-inertial policy rule, several authors have considered policy rules with an interest rate smoothing term. Examples include Aruoba, Cuba-Borda, and Schorfheide (2014) and Erceg and Lindé (2014) , who consider an inertial policy rule with the lagged actual interest rate, and Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010) and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2013) , who briefly consider the model with inertial policy rules with the lagged shadow policy rate. 1 Coenen, Erceg, Freedman, Furceri, Kumhof, Lalonde, Laxton, Lind, Mourougane, Muir, Mursula, de Resende, Roberts, Roeger, Snudden, Trabandt, and in't Veld (2012) examine the effects of various fiscal shocks-including the government spending shock-in several structural models used at policy institutions. Some of the models considered in their paper have either lagged actual or shadow policy rates in the interest rate feedback rule. However, none of these papers have analyzed how the degree and type of policy inertia affect the government spending multiplier at the ZLB.
One exception is a brief sensitivity analysis by Carrillo and Poilly (2013) that reports a smaller government spending multiplier with a larger weight on the lagged shadow policy rate in a model with financial frictions. Our analyses not only show the generality of their result in a wide range of models and parameter configurations, but also clarify the mechanism by which the lagged shadow rate reduces the multiplier by showing that the type of policy inertia matters. Another exercise close to ours is a sensitivity analysis by Erceg and Lindé (2014) that considers the government spending multiplier when the nominal interest rate is determined according to price-level targeting (PLT). They find that the government spending multiplier is smaller under PLT than under a truncated (non-inertial) Taylor rule. In our setup and theirs, the key feature of the policy rule that leads to a smaller fiscal multiplier is that the policy rate after the recession depends on the government spending shock during the recession. While the way the government spending shock alters the post-recession policy rates differs between our model and theirs, our in-depth analysis of the fiscal multiplier in the presence of policy inertia nevertheless 1 They assume an exogenous ZLB duration for most of the analysis.
sheds light on the mechanism behind their result.
Several authors have recently emphasized that the government spending multiplier can be small or modest even at the ZLB. Kiley (2014) finds the government spending multiplier at the ZLB to be below unity in the sticky information model. Cochrane (2014) argues that the multiplier can be small in alternative nonrecursive equilibria, and Mertens and Ravn (2014) find the multiplier below unity when the ZLB is triggered by a belief shock. Braun, Körber, and Waki (2013) demonstrate that the multiplier is only modestly above one under a variety of plausible parameter configurations, and Albertini, Poirier, and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2014) obtain small multipliers in a model with productive government spending. Our paper finds that a simple and empirically plausible modification to the standard setup in this literature-introducing the lagged shadow rate into the truncated Taylor rule-goes a long way toward reducing the government spending multiplier at the ZLB.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on policy inertia. Section 3 describes the model and Section 4 defines the government spending multiplier. Sections 5 and 6 present the results. Section 7 discusses the sensitivity of the main results, and Section 8 concludes.
Empirical Evidence for Policy Inertia

Evidence from Structural Estimation
Structural estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models provides substantial evidence toward an intrinsic adjustment of nominal interest rates in the central bank's reaction function. The level of inertia suggested by these estimates is typically high. Posterior estimates of postwar, pre-Great Recession U.S. data by Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) suggest a persistence parameter between 0.85 and 0.91; Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007) place estimates between 0.7 and 0.86; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) suggest a value between 0.757 to 0.819; and Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate a range from 0.77 to 0.85. Smets and Wouters (2003) also show that for the Euro area, smoothing levels can be particularly high, with parameters ranging from 0.93 to 0.97, suggesting that there is partial adjustment of nominal interest rates in other advanced economies as well.
Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012) estimate a model with a truncated inertial Taylor rule using U.S. data that includes the periods in which the nominal interest rates were at the effective lower bound. They find that the level of smoothed nominal adjustments is still high, with an estimated inertial parameter between 0.78 and 0.92.
Evidence from Reduced-Form Estimation
The reduced-form estimation of the interest rate feedback rule also provides evidence in favor of an interest rate smoothing component. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) show that the weights of inertia have increased since the pre-Volcker period and that levels as high as 0.91 are plausible. Orphanides (2003) finds that Greenbook and Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) survey forecasts suggest inertial parameters in the range of 0.75 to 0.91. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) show that the weights on the lagged policy rate are in the range of 0.87 to 0.97 for the U.S. and other advanced economies, with the majority of estimates suggesting a high level of inertia above 0.9. These international estimates again suggest that intrinsic policy smoothing is not a phenomenon unique to the U.S. alone.
However, the interpretation of the reduced-form estimates has been a subject of debate. Rudebusch (2006) has argued that policy rates are contingent on both data that is incoming and changes in the economic outlook. Thus, policy is defined as more of an extrinsic reaction rather than an intrinsic adjustment-that is, inertia is more likely a reflection of omitted variables in the Fed's reaction function than an intrinsic decision made on the part of the policymakers. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) have argued that a formal statistical test favors the interest rate smoothing hypothesis once one allows for higher-order smoothing, as opposed to the commonly used restriction of a first-order autoregressive process. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) find that autoregressive parameters in the policy rate error term become insignificant or even negative, thus providing evidence against the argument that inertia is merely a mirage of persistent shocks.
Relation with Forward Guidance Policies
An interest rate feedback rule that includes the lagged policy rate has certain elements in common with the recent forward guidance policy in the U.S. whereby the Federal Reserve has stated that the policy rate will be kept at zero for an extended period of time even after the economic recovery strengthens. If the central bank adjusts its policy rate based only on the current economic conditions, it would raise the policy rate as the economic recovery strengthens. On the other hand, if the policy rule features a large weight on the lagged policy rate, then the central bank would raise the policy rate slowly.
Policy inertia is not the only way to model an extended period of low nominal interest rates. For example, larger response coefficients on the economic conditions are also consistent with staying at the ZLB for a long period, as they would lower the nominal interest rate when inflation and output gaps are negative. Modelling the central bank as following optimal commitment policy is another way to make the ZLB bind for a prolonged period.
Lagged Shadow Versus Actual Policy Rates
These empirical considerations point to the validity of introducing the lagged policy rate into the Taylor rule. At the ZLB, however, one must also consider which version of the inertial policy rule-the one with the lagged shadow rate or the one with the lagged actual rate-to introduce.
As we will see shortly, it is easier to generate persistent ZLB episodes with the shadow rate version than with the actual rate version. Thus, our conjecture is that the inertial Taylor rule with the lagged shadow rate is likely to fit the recent prolonged liquidity trap episode in the U.S. better. Also, some policymakers have characterized the Federal Reserve's "low-for-long" policy partially as an attempt to compensate for the fact that the policy rate was constrained at the ZLB in the past, which is also consistent with the shadow rate version of the policy rule. 2 However, making a convincing case for one version of the truncated inertial policy rule over the other requires a formal econometric analysis, a task we leave for future research. We simply note that our result-that these two versions imply substantially different fiscal multipliers-suggests the importance of such econometric analyses. 3
Model
Model Description
We use a standard New Keynesian model with Rotemberg price adjustments. The economy is formulated in discrete time with an infinite horizon, and it is populated with a representative household, a final good producer, a continuum of intermediate goods producers with measure one, and the government.
Household
The representative household chooses its consumption level, amount of labor, and bond holdings so as to maximize the expected discounted sum of utility in future periods.
As is common in the literature, the household enjoys consumption and dislikes labor.
Assuming that period utility is separable, the household problem can be defined by
subject to the budget constraint
or, equivalently,
where C t is consumption, N t is the labor supply, P t is the price of the consumption good, The discount rate at time t is given by βδ t , where δ t is the discount factor shock altering the weight of future utility at time t + 1 relative to the period utility at time t.
Following Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011) among many others, we assume that δ t is governed by an exogenous state s t , which follows a two-state Markov shock process.
s t takes two values, H and L, and the transition probability is given by
and
It can be seen that s t = L is an absolving state. The value of δ t depends on the realization of s t as follows.
An increase in δ t increases the relative valuation of future utility flows, making the household more willing to save for tomorrow and less willing to consume today. While we work with this two-state Markov structure in the baseline, we will consider a case in which this shock follows an AR(1) process.
Firms
There is a final good producer and a continuum of intermediate goods producers 
subject to the CES production function
Intermediate goods producers use labor to produce the imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods according to a linear production function (Y i,t = N i,t ) and then sell the product to the final good producer. Each firm maximizes its expected discounted sum of future profits by setting the price of its own good. 4 We further assume that any price changes are subject to quadratic adjustment costs:
such that
λ t is the Lagrange multiplier on the household's budget constraint at time t and β t−1 t−1 s=0 δ s λ t is the marginal value of an additional profit to the household. The positive time zero price is the same across firms (i.e., P i,0 = P 0 > 0).
Government
We assume that the nominal interest rate is determined according to the following truncated inertial Taylor rule:
where
and R ss and Y ss are the steady-state levels of the nominal interest rate and output. R * t is the hypothetical policy rate that would prevail were it not for the ZLB constraint at time t, and will be referred to as the shadow, notional, or recommended nominal interest rate. In Section 6, we will also consider three alternative assumptions about the determination of the nominal interest rate: (i) that it follows a version of the inertial Taylor rule in which today's shadow rate depends on the lagged actual policy rate, (ii) that it uses price-level targeting, and (iii) that it is chosen optimally by the government with commitment.
In the baseline exercise, we assume that the supply of the one-period risk-free bond is zero and that lump-sum taxes are available to finance the government spending. Thus, the government budget constraint is given by
4 Each period, as it is written below, is in nominal terms. However, we want each period's profits in real terms so the profits in each period will be divided by that period's price level Pt.
5 This expression is derived from the profit maximizing input demand schedule when solving for the final good producer's problem above. Plugging this expression back into the CES production function implies that the final good producer will set the price of the final good Pt = 1 0
Further on, we will consider cases in which a distortionary tax is available and the supply of the government bond is allowed to be nonzero.
Government spending, G t , is governed by the state variable s t introduced earlier:
Our assumption of perfect correlation between the preference shock and government spending shock follows the existing literature. Later, we will consider a case in which the government spending shock follows an AR(1) process.
We will use γ to denote the steady-state share of government spending to output (i.e., γ ≡ Gss Yss ). We will use g to denote the log deviation of G H from G ss (i.e., g ≡ log G H Gss ).
Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing conditions for the final good, labor, and government bond are given by
Nonlinear Equilibrium Conditions
Given P 0 and a two-state Markov shock process, s t , governing the evolution of δ t and
, and a policy instrument {R t } ∞ t=1 , such that (i) given the determined prices and policies, allocations solve the household problem; (ii) P i,t solves the problem of firm i; (iii) P i,t = P j,t ∀i = j; (iv) R t follows a specified rule; and (v) all markets clear.
Combining all of the results from (i)-(v), a symmetric equilibrium can be characterized
satisfying the following equilibrium conditions:
and equations (11) and (12). Equation (18) (21) is the aggregate resource constraint capturing the resource cost of price adjustment, and equation (22) is the aggregate production function.
Semi-Loglinear Equilibrium Conditions
Following the majority of the existing literature, we will mainly work with a semiloglinear version of the economy in which all the equilibrium conditions are log-linearized except for the ZLB constraint on the policy rate. An equilibrium in the semi-loglinear economy is characterized by {Ĉ t ,Ŷ t ,Π t , i t , i * t } ∞ t=1 satisfying the following conditions:
A recursive competitive equilibrium of this semi-loglinear economy is given by a set of policy functions,
satisfies the functional equations above. These policy functions are functions of the lagged shadow nominal interest rate, i * t−1 , and the state, s t ∈ {H, L} . We use a time-iteration method from Coleman (1991) to find them numerically. The details of the solution method are described in the Appendix.
Some have argued that the fiscal multipliers computed in the semi-loglinear economy may be a poor approximation to those in the fully nonlinear economy. Accordingly, we will examine the robustness of our results to solving the model fully nonlinearly in Section 7.
Parameterization
As our baseline, we use parameter values consistent with Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) to match U.S. data during the Great Depression. The values are listed in Table 1 . There are a few parameters that are not in the Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) model but are present in ours. For the steady-state ratio of government spending to output, we choose γ ≡ Gss Yss = 0.2. For the coefficients on inflation and output in the inertial Taylor rule, we choose (φ π , φ y ) = (1.5, 0.25). Our main exercise is to vary the weight on the lagged shadow interest rate. We consider 100 weights that are multiples of 0.01 from 0 to 0.99. 6 We will examine the robustness of our result to alternative parameter values in Section 7. 
Definition of Government Spending Multipliers
We define the government spending multiplier function, GM (i * −1 , g,δ H ), as follows:
where y(·, ·; g,δ H ) is a policy function for output indexed by (g,δ H ). This function measures the average increase in output in response to an increase in the government spending of size g in the high (crisis) state when the lagged shadow rate isr and the state and the size of the discount factor shock isδ H .
We call the government spending multiplier function evaluated at (i * −1 , g,δ H ) = (r, 0.01, 0) the non-crisis multiplier. It measures the average effect of a one percent increase in government spending on output in the economy without any preference shocks. We will also refer to the non-crisis multiplier as the government spending multiplier away from the ZLB, or non-ZLB multiplier.
We call the government spending multiplier function evaluated at (i * −1 , g,δ H ) = (r, 0.01,δ H ) the crisis multiplier whenδ H > 0. This measures the average effect of a one percent increase in government spending on output in the economy when the preference shock hits. We will be interested mostly in a case in whichδ H is sufficiently large that i(i * −1 , H; 0,δ H ) = 0. Our definitions are consistent with those in the literature (e.g.,
Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011) ). We will also refer to the crisis multiplier as the government spending multiplier at the ZLB or the ZLB multiplier. 7
Our definition of the multiplier may appear unnecessarily confusing to some readers, but our definition is the same as that used in the papers on which our work buildsEggertsson (2011), Woodford (2011) , and Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013)-even though the multiplier is often not explicitly defined in these papers. The definition looks complicated because of the perfect correlation assumption on two shocks as well as our desire to be explicit about the dependence of the effects of government spending shocks on the initial condition and the magnitude of shocks. 8 We have decided to be precise at the risk of initially appearing confusing to some readers.
Our government spending multiplier measures the effects of the government spending shock on output at time one. In other words, our baseline multiplier is an impact multi-
plier. An alternative concept of the government spending multiplier that is also common in the literature is the present value multiplier, which aims to capture the average effects of government spending shocks on output over time. Our focus on the impact multiplier is motivated by our desire to remain simple and close to the work of the aforementioned papers we build upon. In particular, we find it useful to make the government spending multiplier in our model without policy inertia identical to the multiplier reported in Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013), as we use their parameter values. We do think that the present-value multiplier is also a useful object, and we examine how the policy inertia affects the present value multiplier in the Appendix. We find that the main results of the paper are robust to the alternative definition of the multiplier.
The main exercise of this paper is to compare the fiscal multipliers in economies with various degrees of policy inertia. When comparing the effects of policy inertia on the fiscal multiplier, we adjust the size of the preference shock,δ H , so that the initial declines in output are the same across different values of the inertia parameter. That is, the government spending multiplier in the economy with ρ r is computed as
where for any ρ r > 0, the adjusted shock size, h(ρ r ), is computed so thatŶ (i * −1 , H; 0, h(ρ r )) in the economy with policy inertia is the same asŶ (i * −1 , H; 0,δ H ) in the economy with ρ r = 0. We make this adjustment because we want to understand the effects of the fiscal multiplier in a comparable situation. In the absence of this adjustment, the initial decline in output will be smaller in the economy with policy inertia than in the economy without it, and one would have difficulty understanding whether the difference in the fiscal 7 When the weight on the nominal interest rate is sufficiently large, the ZLB does not necessarily bind at time one in response to the preference shock. Thus, in this sense, using the terms the crisis multiplier and the ZLB multiplier interchangeably can be misleading. We will be clear whenever this happens to avoid any misunderstandings.
8 Without the prefect correlation assumption, the multiplier is small even at the ZLB. See Woodford (2011). multipliers across two economies is driven by the difference in the policy rule or by the differences in the severity of the recession across two economies. A similar adjustment is made in sensitivity analyses conducted by Braun, Körber, and Waki (2013) and Erceg and Lindé (2014). Figure 1 shows how the fiscal multiplier varies with the policy inertia parameter. The black and red lines are for the government spending multipliers when the nominal interest rate is constrained at the ZLB and when it is not, respectively.
Results
Policy Inertia and Multipliers at the ZLB
The black line shows two features of the fiscal multipliers at the ZLB with inertia.
First, the fiscal multiplier is smaller in the economy with policy inertia than in the economy without it. While the multiplier without inertia is 2.5, the multiplier with an inertia of 0.9 is 1.1. As the inertia increases, the ZLB multiplier approaches the non-ZLB multiplier from above. The multiplier is substantially above those away from the ZLB and remains above one for a plausible range of the weights. A second finding is that the policy inertia affects the fiscal multiplier in a non-monotonic way. As the inertia increases from 0 to 0.03, the multiplier decreases monotonically. However, at an inertia level of 0.04, the multiplier jumps up; after the jump, the multiplier declines monotonically until it jumps up again. 
Smaller Multiplier
To understand the first result, it is useful to examine how the government spending shock affects the economy at the ZLB with and without inertia. The left column of Figure 2 shows realizations of consumption, output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate in the economy without inertia when the preference shock hits the economy at time one and lasts for eight quarters. The right column of Figure 2 shows the same set of impulse response functions for the economy with ρ r = 0.85. 9 In each panel, the black line is the case without an increase in government spending, and the red line is for the case with a 25 percent increase in government spending. 10 Output, consumption, and inflation decline substantially and the nominal interest rate is at the ZLB during the crisis period in economies both with and without policy inertia. Without policy inertia, the economy reverts back to the steady state as soon as the shock disappears, regardless of whether government spending varies. In the economy with policy inertia, the nominal interest rate stays at the ZLB even after the shock disappears. This is because the shadow rate is negative just before the shock disappears. Eventually, the nominal interest rate lifts off and gradually returns to the steady-state level. The nominal interest rate path is thus lower relative to the path under the economy without inertia after the shock disappears. This extended period of low nominal interest rates causes the economy to overshoot in consumption, inflation, and output. This feature of the economy is true regardless of whether or not the government spending shock is present or not.
In the economy without inertia, an exogenous increase in government spending during a recession raises the demand for the final good, which in turn increases output and inflation. With the nominal interest rate stuck at the ZLB, an increase in inflation reduces the real interest rate, which in turn boosts consumption. With a positive consumption response to the government spending shock, the multiplier on output is above one. Notice that, in this economy without inertia, the government spending shock during the recession has no implications for the economy after the recession. The economy is back at the steady state after the shock dissipates regardless of the government spending shock.
In the economy with policy inertia, an exogenous increase in government spending during the crisis has effects on the economy both during and after the recession. An exogenous increase in the government spending during the recession increases consumption, inflation, and output during the recession, as it does in the economy without inertia. In the inertial economy, the higher inflation path during the recession implies a higher path of shadow policy rates relative to the path in the absence of the government spending shock. As a result, the nominal interest rate returns to the steady state more quickly in the presence of the government spending shock than in its absence, and the overshooting of inflation and output is slightly smaller after the recession with the fiscal policy than without. Lower inflation and a higher nominal interest rate after the recession reduces consumption during the crisis since the household is forward-looking and cares about the expected future real rate. Lower output after the recession reduces prices during the crisis since firms are forward-looking and care about the expected future marginal costs of production.
Since consumption is ultimately determined by the undiscounted sum of future expected real interest rates, we can better understand the effect of government spending shocks on consumption, and thus output, by examining the effects of government spending shocks on the path of expected real interest rates. For that purpose, Figure 3 shows expected nominal interest rates, inflation, and real interest rates with and without government spending shocks. The left panels show the economy without policy inertia while the right panels depict the economy with policy inertia. By inspecting the differential effects of government spending on the path of expected nominal interest rates, inflation, and real interest rates, the differences in the government spending multipliers with and without policy inertia become clearer.
As shown in the left panels of Figure 3 , and consistent with the previous discussion, the government spending shock does not affect the expected path of nominal interest rates in the economy without policy inertia. However, an increase in government spending increases inflation expectations at all forecast horizons because government spending is 
expected to remain elevated as long as the preference shock lasts, and an elevated level of government spending is associated with smaller deflation. Accordingly, the expected real interest rates are lower with government spending than without it at all forecast horizons.
In the economy with policy inertia, an increase in government spending during the recession pushes up the path of shadow nominal interest rates and the nominal interest rate moves back to the steady-state level more quickly for any realizations of preference shocks. Thus, the expected nominal interest rate is higher with government spending shocks than without them at all forecast horizons, as shown in the top-right panel. The tighter monetary policy implies that the expansionary effects of the government spending shock on inflation are mitigated. As shown in the middle-right panel, the expected path of inflation is higher with government spending, but not by as much as in the economy without policy inertia. A higher path of expected nominal interest rates and subdued increases in the inflation expectations mean that the government spending shock reduces the expected real interest rate by less in the economy with policy inertia than in the economy without it. According to the bottom panels, the effects of a government spending shock on expected real interest rates, as captured by the grey area, is smaller in the inertial economy than in the non-inertial economy. As a result, consumption rises less in the inertial economy, leading to a smaller output multiplier.
Non-Monotonicity
While the multiplier is smaller in the economy with policy inertia than in the economy without it, the effects of policy inertia on the multiplier is not monotonic. In particular, there are several points in ρ r = [0, 1) where the multiplier increases in response to a marginal increase in ρ r .
To understand where this non-monotonicity comes from, notice that the duration of the ZLB depends on the inertia parameter. In particular, an increase in the policy inertia can increase the duration of the ZLB episode given a certain path of the crisis shock and the expected duration of the ZLB that results. When it does, the increase occurs in a discrete way, since the duration of the ZLB is a discrete variable as shown in Figure 4 .
The fiscal multiplier depends on the duration of the ZLB episode, since the duration determines the periods during which the expansionary effects of the government spending are not offset by a corresponding increase in the nominal interest rate, as emphasized in the work of Eggertsson (2011), Woodford (2011), and Erceg and Lindé (2014) . The longer the ZLB duration, the larger the multiplier. The jumps in the fiscal multiplier in 
Policy Inertia and Multipliers Away from the ZLB
The effect of policy inertia on the government spending multiplier is qualitatively different when the nominal interest rate is away from the ZLB. The red line in Figure 5 shows that the government spending multiplier increases with the weight on the lagged policy rate if the nominal interest rate is away from the ZLB. The effect of inertia on the multiplier is much smaller when the nominal interest rate is away from the ZLB than when it is at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, the multiplier increases by 0.1 (from 0.8 to 0.9) as the inertia increases from zero to 0.85.
In the economy with inertia, the nominal interest rate adjusts slowly to the government spending shock. Thus, output expands by more in the economy with inertia than in the economy without it. Later, as the policy rate gradually increases, output and inflation decline. Overall, the effects of the government spending shock on the expected real interest rate is smaller and consumption decreases by less at time one in the inertial economy than in the non-inertial economy. 6 Additional results
Alternative Policy Rules
An Alternative Version of the Inertial Taylor Rule
Thus far, we have focused on the version of the inertial policy rule in which the shadow policy rate today depends on the lagged shadow policy rate. An alternative formulation would be an inertial rule in which the shadow policy rate depends on the actual policy rate, as follows:
The top-left panel of Figure 6 shows how the government spending multiplier varies with the policy inertia parameter in the economy with this version of the inertial Taylor rule. The multiplier does not vary with the inertial parameter unless the inertia is very close to one. The reason for this insensitivity is that, in this specification of the policy rule, the policy rate after the recession depends on the actual policy rate in the last quarter of the recession, which is zero no matter how dramatically inflation and output decline during the recession. Thus, increased inflation and output during the recession due to the government spending shock do not have any influence on the path of the policy rate after the recession, unless the policy inertia is very close to zero. This can be seen in the first column of Figure 7 , which shows the evolution of output, consumption, inflation, and the nominal interest rate with and without government spending shocks. The figure shows that the government spending shock does not alter at all the path of policy rates after the shock disappears. Accordingly, the government spending multiplier is unchanged from that in the economy without policy inertia. 
Price-Level Targeting
A key mechanism by which the inertia in the policy rule reduces the government spending multiplier is that government spending today affects the evolution of the economy after the shock disappears. This mechanism is not a unique feature of the model with the inertial policy rule studied above; it is also present in the economies where the nominal interest rate is determined according to other history-dependent policy rules. To make this point, we examine the fiscal multipliers in the economy in which the nominal interest rate is determined according to price-level targeting. The nominal interest rate in the price-level targeting regime is determined by where p t is the log-deviation of the price level P t from a target level P * > 0. The evolution of p t is given by
The top-right panel of Figure 6 shows the government spending multipliers from the economy with price-level targeting. According to the black line, the government spending multiplier declines with the weight on the price-level stabilization term in the policy rule.
For a sufficiently large weight on the price level, the ZLB multiplier declines below one. As shown in the middle panels of Figure 7 , under the price-level targeting regime, an increase in government spending during the recession speeds up the return of the policy rate to the steady state and reduces the overshooting of output, consumption, and inflation after the shock disappears. These developments after the recession mitigate the expansionary effects of the government spending shocks during the recession via expectations. Thus, price-level targeting lowers the government spending multiplier in the same manner as our baseline inertial policy rule.
Reifschneider-Williams (2000) Rule
Another well-known history-dependent policy rule is the Reifschneider-Williams (2000) rule. The rule is defined by the following set of equations:
is the unconstrained Taylor rule and
is the sum of all past deviations of the realized nominal interest rate rule from the rate suggested by the unconstrained Taylor rule. Setting α z = 0 yields the baseline. The longer and/or the more severe the contractionary shock is, the larger the cumulative deviation is; as a result, the policy rate is kept at the ZLB for a longer period.
As demonstrated in the bottom-left panel of Figure 6 , the government spending multiplier is lower under the Reifschneider-Williams (2000) rule than under the non-inertial truncated Taylor rule. With a sufficiently large weight on the cumulative deviation variable, the multiplier is about 0.5. As in the inertial rule with lagged shadow rates and the price-level targeting rule, the endogeneity of post-recession policy rates to the government spending shock during a recession is responsible for the lower multiplier. With the Reifschneider-Williams (2000) rule, positive government spending shocks during a recession increase inflation, output, and shadow policy rates. Thus, the cumulative deviation of the actual policy rates from the shadow policy rate is smaller with government spending shocks than without them. In the impulse response function shown in the right column of Figure 7 , the policy path is tighter, with government spending partially offsetting the expansionary effects of government spending shocks during the recession. 11
Optimal Commitment Policy
Investigations of the three alternative policy rules above make it clear that the key factor lowering the government spending multiplier is the endogeneity of the post-recession evolution of policy rates on the economic performance during the recession. Such endogeneity is a hallmark of optimal commitment policy, under which the policy rate is kept at the ZLB even after the contractionary shock disappears and the ZLB duration is endogenous to the outcomes of the economy during the recession. In this sense, our baseline inertial Taylor rule and the price-level targeting rule are similar to optimal commitment policy. When we compute the government spending multiplier under optimal commitment policy, we find that the multiplier is 0.85 at the ZLB. Thus, one way to interpret our main result-that the government spending multiplier declines with policy inertia-is that the closer the policy rule is to optimal commitment policy, the lower the multiplier is. This observation is reminiscent of the result in Nakata (2013) and Schmidt (2013) that the optimal increase in government spending at the ZLB is smaller in the model with commitment than in the model without it.
Is the Government Spending Still Self-Financing?
Thus far, this paper has abstracted from debt dynamics. Denes, Eggertsson, and
Gilbukh (2013) and Erceg and Lindé (2014) have argued that an increase in government expenditure can be self-financing at the ZLB, as an expansion in output increases tax revenue. We have shown that the multiplier can be substantially smaller in the economy with policy inertia. Thus, a natural question is whether or not the government spending increase is still self-financing.
To answer this question, we follow Erceg and Lindé (2014) by augmenting our model with a simple rule for debt dynamics and analyzing the evolution of debt in that setup.
The new government budget constraint is given by
PtYss and τ t =
Tt
Yss are government debt and lump-sum taxes, respectively, as shares of nominal (real) Figure 8 shows how differently the debt-to-GDP ratio evolves in the economies with and without policy inertia. Under this parameterization of the fiscal policy rule, the government spending is indeed self-financing in the absence of inertia. As seen in the left panel of Figure 8 , the debt ratio declines on average in response to a small government stimulus due to the higher government spending multiplier that results in an economy constrained by the ZLB. This is the same result that Erceg and Lindé (2014) and Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) reach in their experiments. However, as inertia in monetary policy increases-resulting in a decline in the government spending multiplier-the reduction in the debt share becomes small, and after a certain point, as seen in the right panel of Figure 8 , the increase in the government spending increases debt. Because a higher degree of policy inertia implies a smaller fiscal multiplier, this diminishes the effect of the increased financing derived from the distortionary labor tax, which is due to an increase in output. As a result, this source of financing is unable to fully offset the upward pressure of government spending on debt. Thus we see that the financing of government spending in this environment depends significantly on the degree of policy inertia. 7 Sensitivity Analyses
Shock Size
In the model without inertia, the size of the preference shock, and thus the severity of the recession, does not affect the fiscal multiplier. However, in the economy with inertia, the size of the shock affects the fiscal multiplier to some degree. According to the top-left panel of Figure 9 , the fiscal multiplier is lower when the recession is less severe.
The fiscal multiplier is lower in the less-severe recession because the duration for which the policy rate is zero after the shock disappears is shorter for any given realization of the preference shock. With a very severe recession, the actual policy rate is kept at zero for a long period. Since an increase in the shadow policy rate due to a government spending shock at the end of the recession gradually diminishes after the recession, the difference between shadow rates with and without government spending shocks becomes small by the time the shadow rate is positive. Thus, the differences in the actual policy rate path is smaller when the recession is severe and the ZLB is expected to bind for a long time.
On the other hand, when the recession is not severe, the lift-off occurs soon after the shock disappears. Under this circumstance, the increase in the shadow rate at the end of the recession is still large, leading to a larger increase in the actual policy rate. A larger increase in the actual policy rate is associated with a higher path of real interest rates, making the fiscal multiplier lower when the recession is less severe.
Output Response Coefficient
The top-right panel of Figure 9 studies the effect of the output gap coefficient on the government spending multiplier. According to the figure, the coefficient on the output gap in the policy rule does not affect the fiscal multiplier when the policy inertia parameter is zero. However, the fiscal multiplier is generally lower when the coefficient on the output gap is larger.
The coefficient on the output gap does not affect the multiplier in the economy without policy inertia because it does not affect the path of actual policy rates; regardless of the coefficient, the policy rate goes back to its steady-state value once the shock disappears.
In the economy with policy inertia, the output gap coefficient affects the path of actual policy rates by affecting the path of shadow rates. With a positive output gap coefficient, an increased output during the recession also contributes to the increase in the shadow rates, speeding up the return of the policy rates to the steady-state level. With a tighter policy path, the effects of the government spending shock are more muted when there is a larger response coefficient on the output gap.
Initial Condition
In our baseline exercise, we compute the government spending multiplier under the scenario in which the initial lagged nominal rate is at the steady-state level,r. In this environment, for a sufficiently large weight on the lagged policy rate, the ZLB does not bind at time one. An alternative worth entertaining when computing the crisis multiplier is to assume that the initial lagged policy rate is zero so that the nominal interest rate is zero at time one for any degree of policy inertia. We find that the initial condition does not materially alter the government spending multiplier, as shown in the bottomleft panel of Figure 9 . This is because the shadow rates decline substantially during the recession and the initial difference ofr is negligible relative to the effect of government spending shocks on the path of shadow rates.
The Great Recession Calibration
The size of the fiscal multiplier is of course sensitive to the choice of structural parameters. For example, the multiplier is 1.2 in the Great Recession calibration of Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) shown in Table 2 , compared to 2.5 in the Great Depression calibration without policy inertia. However, the result that the policy inertia reduces the government spending multiplier at the ZLB is robust, as seen in the bottom-right panel of Figure 9 . 
Distortionary Taxation
Our baseline model assumes that an increase in government spending is financed by a corresponding increase in the lump-sum tax. In this section, we assess the robustness of our result to the economy in which government spending is financed by a labor income tax with no debt.
As shown in the top-left panel of Figure 10 , when the inertia is small, replacing the lump-sum tax with the labor income tax reduces the government spending multiplier.
The reason is as follows. Since the government spending shock increases output by more than one for one, the labor income tax rate must decline in order to balance the budget.
As pointed out by Eggertsson (2011), among others, a decline in the labor income tax reduces output when the nominal interest rate is zero, as it reduces the marginal cost for firms, exacerbates deflation, and raises the real interest rate. As a result, the government spending multiplier on output is lower in the economy with a labor income tax than in the economy with lump-sum taxes. However, in the presence of policy inertia, the government spending shock does not increase output as much and the decline in the labor income tax rate required to balance the budget is smaller. As a result, the wedge between the multipliers in the economies with lump-sum taxation and labor income taxation is smaller, and the fiscal multiplier of the economy with a labor income tax exceeds that of the economy with only lump-sum taxation when there is a sufficiently high degree of policy inertia. 
A Fully Nonlinear Model
Some authors have shown that the commonly used semi-loglinear approximation can be poor when the nominal interest rate is at the ZLB, as the economy tends to be far away from the steady state. In particular, Braun and Waki (2010) and Braun, Körber, and Waki (2013) have shown that the fiscal multiplier computed in the approximated economy often overstates the multiplier in the underlying fully nonlinear economy. Accordingly, we analyze how policy inertia affects the multiplier in a fully nonlinear economy. The government spending multiplier in the fully nonlinear economy is defined similarly to those in the semi-loglinear economy. In this exercise, we mainly follow Braun, Körber, and Waki (2013) and calibrate the parameters to attain a 7 percent decline in output and 2.5 percent deflation in the low state. 12
The top-right panel of Figure 10 shows how the government spending multiplier varies with policy inertia under this calibration. Solid and dashed black lines are respectively the semi-loglinear and fully nonlinear models. As with the government spending multiplier in the semi-loglinear economy, the multiplier in the nonlinear economy declines with the policy inertia parameter. Consistent with Braun, Körber, and Waki (2013) , the multiplier is modestly smaller in the nonlinear economy than in the semi-loglinear economy when in the absence of policy inertia. However, the nonlinear multiplier declines by less as the policy inertia increases, and the multiplier in the nonlinear economy becomes larger than that in the semi-loglinear economy with a sufficiently high ρ r .
AR(1) Shock
Throughout the paper, we followed the majority of the literature and assumed that both the government spending and preference shocks followed two-state Markov processes.
We now modify the semi-loglinear model so that both shocks follow AR(1) processes, as follows:
where we have assumed perfect foresight, following Erceg and Lindé (2014) . In this exercise, we set ρ δ = 0.9 and ρ g = 0.9. We parameterize the reduced-form parameters of our AR(1) shock model based on the values used in Erceg and Lindé (2014) . 13 δ 1 is initialized so as to generate an initial 30 percent decline in output in the absence of a fiscal stimulus (i.e. G 1 = G ss ) and we then consider the effects of a one percent increase in the initial government spending (i.e., G 1 = 1.01G ss ). The bottom-left panel of Figure 10 demonstrates that the main result of the paper-that the government spending multiplier is smaller in the economy with policy inertia-still holds under this alternative assumption on the shock process.
Extended Models
Throughout the paper, we focus on a stylized New Keynesian model without any additional features. In the Appendix, we demonstrate that the main result of the paperthat the presence of the lagged shadow rate reduces the government spending multiplier at the ZLB-is robust to the introducion of features such as consumption habits, price indexation, sticky wages, capital, and hand-to-mouth households into the model.
Sensitivity Analyses for the Policy Rule with the Lagged Actual Policy Rate
Throughout this section, we have demonstrated the robustness of the result that the presence of the lagged shadow policy rate reduces the spending multiplier at the ZLB to various model specifications. Another key result of the paper is that the presence of the lagged actual policy rate has little or no effect on the multiplier at the ZLB. For the sake of brevity, the robustness of this second claim to various model specifications is examined in the Appendix. This claim is indeed robust to various specifications considered in this section.
Conclusion
This paper has studied how the presence of the lagged nominal interest rate in the policy rule affects the fiscal multiplier at the ZLB. We have shown that the fiscal multiplier is nontrivially smaller in the presence of the lagged shadow rate than in the absence thereof. For the Great Depression calibration of Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013), the ZLB multiplier is 1.1 with an inertia parameter of 0.9, as opposed to 2.5 with an inertia parameter of 0. However, the ZLB multiplier remains above one for a plausible range of weights on the lagged policy rate. The claim that the ZLB multiplier is larger than the non-ZLB multiplier is robust. We have also shown that the presence of the lagged actual policy rate has little or no effect on the multiplier.
Our result shows the importance of understanding the conduct of monetary policy in understanding the effects of fiscal policy. Different rules for the nominal interest rate affect the economy differently even at the ZLB because they influence future expectations dissimilarly. While we focused on fiscal multipliers, we believe that this message is more general. For example, the specification of the nominal interest rate policy is likely to matter when one tries to understand the effects of unconventional monetary policies. 14 Thus, coming up with a good characterization of monetary policy in the recent ZLB episode is a high priority for future research.
14 Nakata (2013) shows that the effect of uncertainty is smaller with a larger weight on the lagged shadow rate. Bundick (2014) shows that the effects of productivity and mark-up shocks can be even qualitatively different at the ZLB if the policy rate is chosen according to a rule proposed by Reifschneider and Williams (2000) , which is akin to the baseline truncated inertial Taylor rule considered in this paper.
We use the standard time-iteration method to solve for the set of policy functions.
The time-iteration method starts by specifying a guess for policy functions. Let X(·, ·) ( vec(X s (δ) − X s−1 (δ)) ∞ < 1e-10 is used as the convergence criteria). The lower and upper bounds on the endogenous state, the lagged shadow policy rate, are chosen so that, when we simulate the model for a long sample, the simulated path of the shadow rate stays within the bounds. We used 101 equally spaced grid points on the chosen interval of the lagged shadow rate. 17
15 For all models and all variables, we use flat functions at the deterministic steady-state values as the initial guess. 16 The expectations of the model that assumes that both shocks follow an AR(1) shock process are solved using perfect foresight.
17 We have also experimented with larger numbers of grid points, and the results are unchanged.
B Results from Extended Models
In the main text, we focused on a stylized model without any endogenous variables.
In this section, we consider the robustness of our main result to models with various additional features. The additional features we consider are consumption habits, price indexation, sticky wages, capital, and hand-to-mouth households. Since our solution method is computationally intensive, we will examine a series of models with each additional feature one at a time, as opposed to one model with all additional features. Due to space considerations, the description of the model and the results will be brief and casual.
Further details are available upon request.
B.1 Consumption Habits
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we introduce consumption habits by altering the utility function of the household in the following way.
Households take as given last period's aggregate consumption level, C a t−1 . The habit parameter, ζ, is set to 0. The introduction of consumption habits decreases the ZLB multiplier when there is no policy inertia. The multiplier is 1.1 with consumption habits compared to 1.2 in the baseline. This is because the change in the expected path of real rates induced by the government spending shock has fewer effects on the household consumption decision, as the household's consumption decision is not fully forward-looking in the model with habits. This also leads the fiscal multiplier away from the ZLB to be higher in the model with consumption habits since the crowding out effect derived from increased government demand is mitigated. The multiplier is 0.8 with consumption habits compared to 0.4 in the baseline. Policy inertia reduces the government spending multiplier at the ZLB, but the change is less pronounced in the model with consumption habits; the multiplier is essentially unchanged until the inertia parameter increases to 0.8. From there, the multiplier noticeably decreases and converges to the non-ZLB multiplier as the inertia approaches one. 
B.2 Price Indexation
2)
The indexation parameter, α, is set to 0.5. The top-right panel of Figure The introduction of price indexation increases the ZLB multiplier when there is no policy inertia. The multiplier is 1.6 with price indexation compared to 1.2 in the baseline.
Since firms are now backward-looking, this implies that previous expected paths of real marginal costs figure into their current pricing decision by a multiple of α. An increase in demand for the final good will filter into subsequent pricing decisions in the future, leading to an increase in the expected path of inflation that is marginally higher than the baseline. Consequently, the decrease in the expected path of real interest rates is more dramatic, resulting in a higher fiscal multiplier in the model with price indexation. Policy inertia reduces the government spending multiplier. This reduction is more dramatic in the model with price indexation, since the multiplier still converges to the non-ZLB multiplier as the inertia approaches one.
B.3 Sticky Wages
Following Chugh (2006) and Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2011) , sticky wages are introduced through quadratic adjustment costs. The household chooses consumption, wage, and a one-period risk-free bond to maximize the expected discounted future utility flows,
3) subject to the following labor demand schedule and budget constraint:
Pt is the real wage set by the household and w t =
Wt
Pt is the aggregate real wage.
A labor packer buys labor N h,t from households at their monopolistic wage and sells the packaged labor N t to intermediate goods producers at W t . The packer's problem is given by (B.6) subject to the following CES technology:
The first-order condition yields the labor demand schedule that households are subject to.
This adjustment cost setup is less common than the Calvo-type setup of the nominal wage rigidity, but the resulting semi-loglinear dynamics are identical across these two alternative modelling approaches.
The linearized model implies a composite parameter, κ w = θw−1 ϕw (the slope of the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve), which we set to 0.02. The middle-left panel of The introduction of sticky wage decreases the ZLB multiplier when there is no policy inertia. This is because sticky wages add rigidity to the expected path of real wages, which in turn reduces the responsiveness of expected inflation and thus the responsiveness of real interest rates to the government spending shock. The multiplier is 1.1 with sticky wages compared to 1.2 in the baseline. Policy inertia reduces the government spending multiplier, but the change is less pronounced in the model with sticky wages; the multiplier is essentially unchanged until the inertia parameter increases to 0.7. From there, the multiplier noticeably decreases and converges to the non-ZLB multiplier as the inertia approaches one.
B.4 Capital
The household's problem in the model with capital is given by max Ct,Nt,Bt,Kt,It 8) subject to the following budget constraint and capital accumulation equation:
The adjustment cost function is given by AC
The production technology of the intermediate goods producers is given by
where K s f,t = K f,t−1 is the level of effective capital used by each firm. Their profit maximization problem becomes max B.12) subject to the usual demand schedule imposed by the final good producer.
We set α = 0.2, ϕ k = 17, and δ k = 0.025. The middle-right panel of Figure The introduction of capital increases the ZLB multiplier when there is no policy inertia.
The multiplier is 3.0 with capital compared to 2.5 in the baseline. The larger multiplier can be explained by the fact that there are now two private channels that contribute to demand for the final good: consumption and investment. While consumer demand still increases due to the lower expected path of real interest rates, this lower path also implies lower costs for making investments. The increase in demand for the final good means that expected revenue from investments increases. Lower costs and higher revenue signal the households to increase their investment demand. The resultant higher consumer and investment demand implies a multiplier greater than the baseline. Just as in the baseline, policy inertia reduces the multiplier in the model with capital.
B.5 Hand-to-Mouth Households
In the model with hand-to-mouth households, we assume that a fraction of the households do not have access to financial markets. Their optimization problem is given by 13) subject to the following budget constraint:
Following Galí, Lopéz-Salido, and Vallés (2007), we assume that the steady-state share of the lump-sum tax is chosen so that the steady-state consumption level is equal across the two types of households. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that an increase in lump-sum taxes are shared equally across households. That is,T r,t =T k,t =T t in the linearized version of the model.
We set ω, the share of hand-to-mouth households, to 0.2. The bottom-left panel of Not surprisingly, the introduction of the hand-to-mouth consumers increases the fiscal multipliers both at and away from the ZLB. The increase in the real wage, induced by the increase in the government spending, gives Keynesian households more incentive to work and spend. Policy inertia reduces the government spending multiplier at the ZLB as in the baseline model without hand-to-mouth consumers, but the effects of policy inertia are more pronounced in the model with hand-to-mouth consumers. The ZLB multiplier is 2.0 without policy inertia compared to 1.1 with policy inertia of 0.9.
C Sensitivity Analyses for the Model with the Lagged Actual Policy Rate
In Section 7 and Appendix B, we have considered the robustness of the result with respect to the lagged shadow rate specification of the inertial Taylor rule. Here, we demonstrate the robustness of the result that the presence of the lagged actual policy rate have little or no effect on the fiscal multiplier to various specifications considered in Section 7 and Appendix B. (as discussed in Section 6), the result that the presence of the lagged actual policy has no effect on the multiplier holds under alternative specifications. Figure C. 3 shows how the coefficient on the lagged actual policy rate affects the multiplier under a series of extended models considered in Appendix B. In all of the extended models, the lagged actual policy rate has little or no effect on the multiplier.
D Present Value Multipliers
Our baseline concept of the multiplier measures the effect of government spending shocks on output upon impact. We have used this concept as our baseline in order to stay close to the work of Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) and also to be simple and transparent. An alternative concept also common in the literature is the present value multiplier, which aims to measure the average effects of government spending shocks on output over time.
To define the present value multiplier in the context of our model with two-state Markov shocks and an endogenous state variable, let us first define the present value multiplier function as follows. The numerator contains the expected discounted sum of changes in output due to government spending shocks up to time k, and the denominator contains the expected discounted sum of government spending shocks up to time k. This is the same definition as that in Uhlig (2011). 18 Notice that when k is zero, this definition becomes identical to our baseline government spending multiplier function in the main text. Consistent with the definition of our baseline impact multiplier, this function evaluated at i * −1 =r, g = 0.01, 18 Some authors adjust the discount factor term R −j ss to reflect time variation in the household preference. See, for example, Leeper, Traum, and Walker (2011) and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2013) . andδ-which is chosen to generate a 30 percent decline in output at time one-will be referred to as the present value multiplier at the ZLB. This function evaluated at i * −1 =r, g = 0.01, andδ = 0 will be referred to as the present value multiplier away from the ZLB. Figure D .1 shows how the present value multipliers with three different cutoff dates (k = 8, 20, 40) vary with the degree of policy inertia of the lagged shadow rate type.
According to the figure, the present value multiplier behaves similarly to our baseline government spending multiplier.
E Average and Marginal Multipliers
The multipliers we emphasize are what Erceg and Lindé (2014) call average multipliers; they measure the average increase in output in response to a given increase in government spending. Another interesting object is the marginal multiplier that measures the marginal increase in output to a further -increase in government spending when government spending of size g is already in place. Formally, the marginal government spending multiplier function, GM (i * −1 , g,δ H ), is defined as follows: 100 . In our framework with two-state Markov shocks, the average and marginal multipliers are identical at the ZLB in the absence of policy inertia, unless the government spending shock is extremely large so that the ZLB does not bind at all with the government spending shock. However, if there is inertia in the policy rule, the average and marginal multipliers differ even in this two-state Markov shock model.
The reason why the marginal multiplier is lower than the average multiplier in the economy with policy inertia is as follows. The effects of the government spending shock depend importantly on how long the policy rate is kept at zero after the shock disappears.
The longer the policy rate is expected to remain zero, the larger the government spending multiplier is. The expected ZLB duration is shorter when there is already some govern- Fiscal Multiplier % Change in Gov't Spending ZLB Episode: ρ r = 0.85 ment spending in place than when there is not. Thus, a marginal increase in government spending is smaller when there is already some government spending in place than otherwise. This logic is closely related to why the multiplier is smaller when the shock size is smaller, which was discussed in detail in Section 7.
